One of the most important ways that attitudes rooted in moral conviction theoretically differ from other attitudes is that people perceive their moral beliefs to be objectively and universally true. In other words, people do not accept or expect that their conceptions of morality are or should be contextually contingent or situationally variable, and they are offended at the very idea that morality could be relative (e.g., Darwell, 1998; Pope, 2013; Simpson, 1974; Smith, 1994). Even philosophers who reject the idea of moral objectivism (e.g., Mackie, 1977) nonetheless accept that people’s commitment to the idea that there are objective moral truths is absolutely central to folk metaethics (i.e., the way real people in the real world experience morality).
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Moral conviction is certainly implicated in and motivates people’s willingness to fight for a more just and humane society, even when it is costly to do so (e.g., when it requires going against majority opinion or current law) and otherwise facilitates political and civic engagement.